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PUBLIC UTILITIES - RATE REGULATION - VALIDITY OF TEMPORARY RATE ORDER - Of interest to students of public utility rate
regulation will be the case of Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co.1
in which the United States Supreme Court side-stepped a reconsideration of the fair value rule as announced in Smyth v. Ames,2 and a
determination of the constitutionality of temporary rates based on the
prudent investment theory,
In r937 the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act empowering
the Public U:tility Commission "in any proceeding involving the rates
of a public utility • • • if it be the opinion that the public interest so
requires [to] immediately :fix, determine, and prescribe temporary
rates to be charged by such utility, pending the final determination of
such rate proceeding." 8 The temporary rates so prescribed were to be

1 307 U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939),rehearing denied May IS, 1939. The writer
has had an opportunity to read the briefs submitted by counsel for the Edison Company,
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, and the United States as amicus curiae, for
which, at this point, he wishes to acknowledge due credit for the use of any material
contained therein.
2 169 U.S. 466 at 547, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898). In ascertaining fair value "original
cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount
and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present as compared with the original
cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under particular
rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all
matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right
in each case."
8 Pa. Laws (1937), p. 1053, § 310 (a), 66 Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1938),

§

IISO
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sufficient "to provide a return of not less than five per centum upon
the original cost, less accrued depreciation, of the physical property
( when first devoted to public use) ••• used and useful in the public
service..••"" A further section of the act provided for recoupment
of gross income by the company if upon the determination of the rate
proceeding it was found that the final rates were in excess of the temporary rates. 11
Pursuant to the statute, the commission directed the Edison Light
& Power Co. to lower its rates so as to reduce the annual gross operating revenue in the amount of approximately $435,000. The company
filed a bill to enjoin the order of the commission. A specially constituted district court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the order
on the grounds, inter alia, that the statute was unconstitutional since
it did not provide for a weighing of the elements pertinent to determining fair value, and that, even assuming the statute to be constitutional
in its procedural aspects, the temporary rate order was invalid because
the return permitted was confiscatory.6
On appeal the lower court's decision was reversed. Speaking
through Justice Reed, the Court found that the rates prescribed by the
commission were not confiscatory; and the test of confiscation was that
of the fair value rule.~ In a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
it was pointed out that the Court had quite unnecessarily avoided a
consideration of the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania temporary
rate statute. 8 As noted later in this discussion, precedents and sound
analogies were clearly available for the Court to follow in holding
such a statute constitutional.
This comment is concerned with a discussion of temporary rates
prescribed on a basis other than that of the fair value rule. The writer
will first discuss temporary rates effective during a period of rapid
"Ibid.
5
Ibid., (e).
• (D. C. Pa. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 192.
T 59 S. Ct. at 720. The Court evaded a consideration of the validity of the
temporary rate statute by declaring that the commission had drawn the order in accord
with a prior ruling of the Middle District Court which had stated compliance with
Smyth v. Ames was necessary in temporary rate making; since the commission, therefore, interpreted the statute as requiring consideration of elements other than original
cost in fixing temporary rates, the Court was "reluctant to accept a construction which
brings forward" the issue of constitutionality.
8
"It is one thing to avoid unconstitutionality even at the cost of a tortured
statutory construction. It is quite another to recognize the validity of a statute directed
expressly to the situation in hand and so employed by the state authorities, when constitutionality of that statute is as incontestably clear as the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals has demonstrated it to be in sustaining the sister statute of the
Pennsylvania Act••••" 59 S. Ct. at 725.
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price fluctuation. Following this, attention will be given to temporary
rates possible under a statute, of which the Pennsylvania act is an
example, together with a discussion of the constitutionality of such a
statute. In closing, the possible advantages of temporary rates of the
second type will be pointed out.
I.

Temporary rate orders may be classified either as an emergency
type, issued when the general price level is rapidly rising or falling,

or, as proposed by the type of statute of which the Pennsylvania act
is an example, as an intermediate step in the normal determination of
final rates. With the former the courts are quite familiar. During the
World War and in the years immediately following, temporary orders
increasing the rates which public utilities might charge were issued
by the state commissions upon a showing by the utilities that the sudden increase in prices rendered the existing rates insufficient to meet
operating costs. 9 A few states had enacted statutes permitting their commissions, in cases of emergency, temporarily to alter or suspend existing rates.10 But by far the large majority had no such emergency
statutes, with the necessary consequence that their commissions so
acted during this period under the general legislative authorization
to determine just and reasonable rates.
Though the commissions in issuing these emergency orders did not
consider all of the elements necessary to a determination of fair value,
as set forth in Smyth v. Ames, the courts uniformly upheld the temporary orders. This result followed whether or not the orders were
issued pursuant to an emergency statute. 11 To protect consumers in
case the temporary rates so fixed were too high, it was provided in
9
City of La Crosse v. Railroad Commission, 172 Wis. 233, 178 N. W. 867
(1920); Chicago Railways Co. v. Chicago, 292 Ill. 190, 126 N. E. 585 (1920);
Kansas City v. Public Service Comm., 276 Mo. 539, 210 S. W. 381 (1918); O'Brien
v. Board of Public Utilities Commrs., 92 N. J. L. 587, 106 A. 414 (1919); City of
New York v. New York Tel. Co., 115 Misc. 262, 189 N. Y. S. 701 (1920), affd. 202
App. Div. 796, 194 N. Y. S. 924 (1921); Muskogee Gas & Elec. Co. v. State, 81
Okla. 176, 186 P. 730 (1920); Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. v. Nebraska State
Railway Comm., 103 Neb. 695, 173 N. W. 690 (1919).
10 See Wis. Stat. (1937), § 196.70; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 54-712;
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. I I I 2/3, § 36 (4).
11 Under the Wisconsin emergency statute, see City of La Crosse v. Railroad
Commission, 172 Wis. 233, 178 N. W. 867 (1920); Chicago Railways Co. v. Chicago, 292 Ill. 190, 126 N. E. 585 (1920). Not under an emergency statute, see Kansas
City v. Public Service Comm., 276 Mo. 539, 210 S. W. 381 (1918); O'Brien v.
Board of Public Utilities Commrs., 92 N. J. L. 587, 106 A. 414 (1919).
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some of the decisions that this condition was to be rectified in the order
:fixing the :final rates.12
That the economic predicament of the consumers in a period of
rapidly falling prices demanded emergency decreases in rates was
decided in several cases after I 92 I, where rate reduction orders were
upheld in the absence of a clear showing on the part of the utility that
the temporary rates were confiscatory.18
Sound economic reasons fortify the decisions of these courts. Public
utilities must have the increased rates in a rapidly rising price level
period, else in many cases they are reduced to insolvency. And likewise, the consumers should be allowed to pay less for the public service rendered during a rapidly falling price level period, else the economic emergency is intensified.14
Other measures to cope with the emergency problem have been
proposed. Such is the suggestion that in good economic times the utilities should be allowed to charge more than a fair return, the excess
to be set aside in an "emergency reserve," so that in times of depression
the rates may be reduced below the compensatory level, and the utility
allowed to draw on the reserve for such an additional amount as may
be necessary to secure a fair return.111 The use of efficient index numbers
12 See Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. v. Nebraska State Railway Comm., 103
Neb. 695, 173 N. W. 690 (1919).
18 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Comm., (D. C. La.
1922) 283 F. 215; Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm., 83 Okla.
281, 201 P. 505 (1921). For a discussion of this problem during the last depression,
see Swidler, "The Uncertainties in the Legal Status of Temporary Rates," I 2 PuB.
UTIL. FoRT. 136, 202 (1933). On a careful reading of the cases on this point, no
provision could be found for recoupment by the company if upon the final rate determination it was discovered that the temporary rates yielded less than a fair return on
fair value during the emergency period. That conditions of an economic crisis may
affect what return is held to be confiscatory is discussed by Lilienthal, "Regulation of
Public Utilities During the Depression," 46 HARV. L. REV. 745 at 768 et seq.
(1933). Cf. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458 (1921).
14 In a period when wages and prices are rapidly falling, if utility rates are not
adjusted accordingly a larger proportion of the consumer's dollar is spent for utility
services, thereby leaving a smaller proportion for other commodities, the manufacturers
of which, having curtailed markets, must cut down their own operations, with the
final result of an increase in unemployment. Swidler, "The Uncertainties in the Legal
Status of Temporary Rates," 12 PUll. UTIL, FoRT. 136 at 139 (1933), gives a
discussion of this economic aspect of the problem.
15 Lilienthal, "Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depression," 46 HARV.
L. REV. 745 at 755 (1933). As a matter of practical application this suggestion is not
without its difficulties. The absence of "good times," a depression or an emergency, is
not so difficult to recognize; but the existence of the positive side of economic conditions offers an opportunity for many differing opinions, with the result of much bickering
between the utility and commission as to when the former is entitled to begin to charge
more than the legal fair return.
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to arrive at present value by adjusting the value at the last rate proceeding is a further possibility.16 Already in actual practice is the suggested procedure of negotiation between the utility and the commission
to effect a temporary rate change without the protracted valuation
investigations typical of the normal rate fixing process. 17
2.

The differences between the emergency statutes and those providing for temporary rates pending the final determination in normal rate
proceeding are several and patent. In the former the commission must
find an emergency to exist, and such an "emergency" has been interpreted to mean an economic depression or a period in which prices are
rising rapidly.18 In the latter the commission need only be of the
opinion that "the public interest so requires." A reasonable construction of this qualifying clause can mean no more than that the commission has grounds for believing that the existing rates are not just and
reasonable. Secondly, the emergency statutes provide no standard upon
which the rate is to be determined,10 whereas original cost less accrued
depreciation of the property useful in the public service is expressly
stated as the valuation basis in the second type of statute. Thirdly, no
recoupment provision is found in the emergency statutes, whereas
recoupment is expressly provided for in the temporary rate statutes. 20
In considering the question of the constitutionality of statutes providing for temporary rates pending the normal rate proceeding, we
·should bear in mind that such statutes provide but a convenient step in
the rate establishment. The rates so fixed are interim rates, effective
until the final rates are set. Further, there is no attempt by these
statutes to change the basis upon which final rates are established.
In the case of Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co.21 a reduc16 The adjective "efficient" is advisedly used, for in West v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co. of Baltimore, 295 U. S. 661, 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935), the
Court struck down a commission's proposed rates because the separate price indices
used in arriving at the present property valuation were found to be unreliable, giving
a variety of different results. It is believed that if reliable price indices are developed,
the Court will not find the use of them, per se, to be a procedural denial of due
process. Cf. 51 HARV. L. REv. 885 at 891 (1938).
17 See excerpt from report of Utility Consumers National Policy Committee,
quoted in Spurr, "Has Utility Regulation Been Reduced to Negotiation and Wheedling?" 20 PuB. UnL. FoRT. 259 (1937), and discussion therein on this point.
18 See statutes cited in note 10, supra, and cases cited in note 9, supra.
19 See statutes cited in note 10, supra.
20 Pa. Laws (1937), p. 1053, § 310 (e), 66 Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1938),
§ u50 (e); N. Y. Laws (1934), c. 287, 47 Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1938),
"Public Service Law," § l 14.
21 262 U. S. 43, 43 S. Ct. 466 (1923).
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tion of the rates charged by the company had been ordered during
the pendency of a rate case against the company. This order was issued
under a New Yark statute containing no provision for recoupment by
the company if the final rates were found to be greater than those
prescribed under the temporary order. An injunction was issued against
the enforcement of the rates. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the lower court's order was upheld. The Court said in the
course of its opinion:
"Nor did the fact that the orders of the Commission merely
prescribed temporary rates to be effective until its final determination, deprive the Company of its right to relief at the hands
of the court. The orders required the new reduced rates to be
put into effect on a given date. They were final legislative acts
as to the period during which they should remain in effect pending the final determination; and if the rates prescribed were confiscatory the Company would be deprived of a reasonable return
upon its property during such period, without remedy, unless
their enforcement should be enjoined." 22
In 1934 the New York Legislature amended its Public Service
Law and established the temporary rate order provision from which
the Pennsylvania act was derived. 23 An express proviso for recoupment
by the company was omitted; however, the amended law included the
following:
"The commission is hereby authorized in any proceeding in which
temporary rates are fixed, determined and prescribed under this
section, to consider the effect of such rates in fixing, determining
and prescribing rates to be thereafter charged and collected by said
public utility company on final determination of the rate proceeding." 24
The quoted provision was expressly held by the New Yark Court
of Appeals to have satisfied the deficiencies pointed out by the Court in
the Prendergast case: ~5
"This section ... forces the Public Service Commission to consider the returns from the temporary rate and to establish the
22

Ibid., 262 U. S. at 49 (italics supplied).
N. Y. Laws (1934), c. 287, 47 Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1938), §
II4. The interpretation rendered by the New York Court of Appeals of the clause in
the statute quoted at note 24, infra, was spelled out in the recoupment provision of
the Pennsylvania act.
24
N. Y. Laws (1934), c. 287, 47 Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1938),
§ 114.
2
~ Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 364, 3 N. E. (2d) 512 (1936).
23
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permanent rate, or the final rate, accordingly; that is, if the temporary rate has proved to be too low the final rate must make it
up to the company." 26
The Supreme Court of the United States may turn from state
decisions to its own for further analogies and precedents. In The New
England Divisions Case,21 the Interstate Commerce Commission had
issued a temporary rate order which prescribed a division of joint rates
among certain railroads. The commission acted before a complete
analysis of all available evidence was made, and it did not consider each
division, road, and rate separately. The order was to be effective until
further action by the commission, and was left open for correction.
The Court sustained this provisional act by the commission, stating
that:
"A hearing may be a full one, although the evidence introduced does not enable the tribunal to dispose of the issues completely or permanently; and although the tribunal is convinced,
when entering the order thereon, that, upon further investigation,
some changes in it will have to be made. • . . That the order is
not obnoxious to the due process clause, because provisional, is
clear. If this were not so, most temporary injunctions would violate
the Constitution." 28
A further analogy for sustaining the temporary rate statute may be
found in the common practice of the courts in requiring public utility
companies to put up a bond to pay back overcharges to the consumers
which were exacted while litigation over a rate order was in progress.
Logic would dictate no change in constitutionality if the remedy be
reversed, requiring that the customers should make good the loss
which the company sustains when temporary rates are fixed at too low
a level.29
An objection advanced against the validity of the temporary rate
statute is that the commission has no right to require r!;!coupment from
a new consumer. But we can be confident that the number of new customers so affected will be small.
"A few consumers may be new customers paying what the old
consumer should have paid. • •• We can never work our institu26

Ibid., 271 N. Y. at 375.
261 U.S. 184, 43 S. Ct. 270 (1923).
28 Ibid., 261 U. S. at 201.
29 This argument was advanced in Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y.
364 at 373-374, 3 N. E. (2d) 512 (1936), and cited with approval by the
district court when the Driscoll case was first before it, Edison Light & Power Co.
v. Driscoll, (D. C. Pa. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 1 at 4.
27
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tions of government if we refine matters to such an extent that we
have to consider all these little details.... Besides, when we speak
of the consumer-the customer-we mean the public, not individuals." 80
It would seem, then, that when the issue of constitutionality of
temporary rate statutes is considered by the Court to be squarely before
it, no difficulty should be encountered in sustaining them. Smyth v.
Ames says nothing of temporary rates. Its fair value rule applies to
the end result of the rate proceeding. Realizing that the temporary
rates based on original cost, less accrued depreciation, are only initial
steps in the final rate establishment, and remembering that any loss
sustained because of the temporary rates may be recouped by the
company, the Court, it is submitted, should approve these temporary
rate statutes. 81

3.
The advantages of this new technique in rate regulation may be
briefly suggested. In the first place, it obviates the old procedure by
which a utility secured a restraining order against a commission's proposed decrease in rates upon posting a bond for the protection of consumers. This procedure is subject to criticism. Certain consumers did
not receive their refunds when the decreased rates were finally sustained by the courts. 82 The expenses of refunding have been extremely
high in many cases,88 and this distribution cost is eventually borne by
the consumers. Though no direct causal relation between the refund
procedure and the delays incident to appeals to the courts can dogmatically be proven, it is at least pertinent to point out the general
indifference of the utilities to the inordinate delays common in rate
Bronx Gas & Elec. Co. v. Maltbie, 271 N. Y. 364 at 374-375, 3 N. E. (2d)
512 (1936). Cf. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 23 S. Ct.
571 (1903).
81 It may be noted that if the temporary rate statutes providing a return of not
less than a given percentage upon original cost are declared unconstitutional, the effect
will be the impossibility of establishing any kind of temporary rates. If in fixing a
temporary rate all the elements constituting fair value must be considered, then it
really is no temporary rate at all.
82
Lilienthal, "Regulation of Public Utilities During the Depression," 46 HARV.
L. REV. 745 at 768, note 45 (1933). Cf. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Railroad Comm.,
(D. C. Ala. 1913) 208 F. 35 at 60.
88 Justice Brandeis pointed out in a concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 at 89, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936), that the cost of
making refunds on excessive charges in the Chicago telephone rate cases had amounted
to $2,575,412.89 (to November 30, 1935), with over $2,100,000 remaining to be
disposed of.
80

80
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litigation. 34 It is submitted that adoption by the states of a similar
temporary rate statute will help to eliminate this unfortunate aspect
of the rate problem.
But what is probably the outstanding advantage of the temporary
rate order is to be found in the use the commissions may make of the
experience gained under such orders in their final determination of
rates. The Court on more than one occasion has pointed out the predominant place actual experience should take, if available, in the determination of rates. 35 Here is an effective means whereby estimates
of returns from rates can be checked on the basis of experience. Furthermore, the way is opened for a pragmatic examination of the adequacy of a rate schedule; if under a temporary order the utility continued to prosper and had enough income to pay its current expenses,
including a depreciation allowance, and also pay interest on its bonds
and a liberal dividend on its stock, it could hardly be argued that a
final order confirming the temporary order was confiscatory. 36 Moreover, in such a case the commission could continue to adhere to the
Smyth v. Ames formula by giving to the elements of value there
enunciated such weight as would result in a legal rate base approximating the one established by experience.
A further, though indirect, advantage may be the abandonment of
emergency rate statutes and the substitution therefor, or the enactment
in states without such emergency statutes, of a statute embracing the
salient features of the New York and Pennsylvania statutes, which
include, of course, inter alia, the emergency situation. A standard will
then be available even in the case of emergency rates. The public
utilities should welcome this possible action by the states, especially in
times of rapidly falling prices, for under the old emergency procedure
no provision for recoupment is found.
Thomas K. Fisher
84

"On September 13, 1921, the Illinois Commerce Commission •.. issued an
order that the Company ~how cause why its rates should not be reduced. • • • On
August 16, 1923, the Commission entered an order reducing the rates, to become
effective October 1, 1923. • •• On April 30, 1934, this Court sustained the validity
of the rate order entered August 16, 1923." Brandeis, J., in St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 at 88, 56 S. Ct. 720 (1936), in speaking of the
time factor in the case of Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U. S. l 51, 54
S. Ct. 658 (1934).
85
West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utility Comm., 294 U. S. 79, 55 S. Ct. 324
(1935); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota, 216 U.S. 579, 30 S. Ct. 423 (1910);
City of Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 225 U. S. 430, 32 S. Ct. 741
(1912); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1934).
86
Cf. Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1934).

